Use policy
For many years huge expatriate populations have played a much documented role in the economic development of the Gulf monarchies. But a less well told story is how expatriates have also contributed to their political stability. As non-citizens their presence in such large numbers has reinforced the elite status of most citizens in the region -an important non-pecuniary legitimacy resource for the various ruling dynasties. Moreover, the primarily employment-driven status of expatriates has meant that they have usually adopted either an apolitical or even pro-status quo stance. In some cases their perceived loyalty has led to selective naturalization or even direct co-option into security services. Disrupting this decades-old relationship, however, have been the recently changing political and economic circumstances of the Gulf monarchies. Already decisions have been made to reduce significantly expatriate populations due to accumulating pressures. Such measures are likely to threaten the historic political advantages the presence of expatriates has provided for these polities.
Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies: Politics, Security, and the Arab Spring For several decades the six Gulf monarchies -Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman -have relied on substantial expatriate workforces. This is not only because of the small sizes of their indigenous populations relative to the enormous development opportunities that arose since the first oil booms, but also because of the benefits and privileges enjoyed by most citizens in these states and their subsequent preference for public sector or other perceived high status employment. There are now somewhere between fifteen and nineteen million foreigners employed in these states, 1 working across all sectors, and from all parts of the world. Few can ever aspire to citizenship and most are strictly temporary guest workers, even if they are highly skilled. This paper goes beyond the more conventional political economy discussions on the impact of these expatriate populations, most of which have focused on the need for labour nationalization strategies, 2 disparities between public and private sector recruitment, 3 3 remittance flows, 4 or the need for 'expatriate acculturation' in order to boost productivity. 5 Instead the focus is on the effect of such a massive expatriate presence on the domestic politics of the Gulf monarchies. Far from being a liability, an argument is made that the expatriate presence has historically provided ruling elites with two significant political advantages in managing their relationship with indigenous populations, along with a number of other peripheral benefits.
Firstly, from the perspective of the ruling families' social contracts with their citizens -which are frequently used to explain the resilience of these polities 6 -the huge numbers of expatriates residing and working in the Gulf monarchies have allowed elites to gain further legitimacy from citizens beyond conventional wealth distribution strategies or more traditional legitimacy resources such as religion, heritage, and cults of personality. This is because the highly visible abundance of expatriates has effectively allowed these states to elevate their indigenous populations -the 'locals' -to a higher and carefully guarded social status above most expatriates, including those from more developed countries. Secondly, and more subtly, instead of presenting security threats or promoting subversive external ideas, these largely apolitical, labour migrant communities have usually formed silent constituencies that remain keen to preserve the status quo and their employment opportunities, even if they suffer from poor working conditions or apparent abuses. 12 -most Gulf states have shied away from abolishing the system outright, given the significant economic benefits it brings to many citizens. In the most straightforward examples, well placed nationals can essentially sell their status as a citizen to foreign partners who need to conform to existing legislation (such as having a sponsor control at least fiftyone percent of the company's stock 13 ) and seek a local partner. In these situations it is not uncommon to find that the local partner is effectively a 'silent partner,' with the expatriate often being responsible for the day-to-day running of the company. As such, the system has 6 often allowed citizens to enjoy another stream of income above and beyond any public sector salary, land, or property that they may have acquired with the help of the state. 15 Meanwhile in Bahrain about 550,000 or nearly half of the island's population are thought to be expatriates -or at least were before the 2011 uprisings began. 16 The most dramatic examples are, however, in the very resource-rich small monarchies.
Kuwait reached a peak of over 1.1 million expatriates in early 2013 -account for nearly seventy percent of the total population, 17 while in the UAE expatriates continue to make up about ninety percent of population. 18 The latter figure is based on official UAE government data claiming that the total population has risen to 9 million 19 -this has however been widely disputed and may be put down to the UAE's historic rivalry with the much larger Saudi 7
Arabia. Qatar, now the fastest growing Gulf economy with the smallest number of citizensonly 290,000 -will soon catch up with the UAE. Already the population comprises eighty percent expatriates, and with a staggering annual population growth rate of nearly sixty percent their proportion will increase dramatically.
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While these figures may seem alarming, most of these millions of expatriates are undoubtedly based in the region to make money and eventually return to their home countries relatively better off. Most only stay in these states for two to five years, with very few regarding their host country as a real home or a retirement destination. In this regard they differ greatly from immigrants who arrive in 'melting pot' cities such as New York, London,
and Paris -many of whom intend to spend a substantial part of their lives there and eventually help shape the societies and politics of their adopted nation. Gulf expatriates are thus better viewed as strictly temporary economic migrants. Although, as described, they are very rarely entitled to the full benefits enjoyed by citizens, they nevertheless enjoy a tax free salary which is usually allows a higher standard of living than they would experience in their country of origin. In many cases they have no sustained interest in the politics of their host country, or if they do, it rarely feeds into indigenous opposition movements. In many ways they become a loyal, silent support base for the ruling families, as the latter usually portray themselves as the guardians of stable, fairly apolitical states where money can be made safely and smoothly and there is no requirement to integrate into the local culture or acquire the local language.
Currently it is the tiny kingdom of Bahrain that perhaps provides the best example of this phenomenon, as its ruling family is undoubtedly facing the stiffest local opposition. In summer 2013 the Bahrain Federation of Expatriate Associations began an overtly progovernment petition -aiming for 100,000 signatures -calling for 'peace and prosperity' and the 'unification of citizens and expats' under the Al-Khalifa king. 21 Less dramatically but 8 more structurally significant, the UAE's has long provided a good example of expatriate integration into a 'state as a corporation' model, rather than a community, with senior ministers having claimed that 'the government emphasizes prosperity over political development… we think twenty percent politics / eighty percent development.' 22 On a more micro level the ruler of the UAE's constituent emirate of Dubai goes even further than this.
Styling his make-shift government as 'Dubai Incorporated' or 'Dubai Inc.', his aim has been to portray himself as the chief executive officer of a corporation, rather than as an autocrat presiding over an unelected government. 23 As the emirate's indigenous population has continued to shrink, relative to the influx of hundreds of thousands of expatriates each year, the government often announces new initiatives to hold the situation in check -seemingly an effort to appease conservatives. But in many ways spiralling expatriate numbers have suited the Dubai ruler's interests well -even if it alarms the dwindling citizenry -as he is able to govern over a city mostly made up of temporary migrants. deported from Gulf monarchies due to state-level political disputes), 25 there is a general acceptance of the status quo. Thus, as with the more temporary migrants, most of these expatriates prefer to live quietly and apolitically, or try to save up enough to emigrate elsewhere.
Much international media attention focuses on the plight of the huge population of unskilled expatriates. In particular, the appalling living conditions in some of the workers'
camps -some of which have no basic facilities or even sewerage -are routinely portrayed as a manifestation of evil, immoral, slave-based economies. 26 There is certainly much truth to this, with 'workers' often viewed as somehow sub-human by citizens and skilled expatriates alike, and usually discriminated against by apartheid-like regulations (for example, not being allowed to enter shopping malls, parks, museums, and in some cases even 'public' squares).
But in many ways this outrage is primarily the result of having what appears to be a first world society occupying the same uncomfortably small spaces as a developing world society.
Very few of the workers can be considered slaves, and most have not made a step into the unknown. In many cases these men have followed their fathers, brothers, or other male relatives who have worked there before, usually with the same bad conditions. Most are still separated from their passports upon arrival, driven around on cattle trucks, and work punishingly long hours in very high temperatures. Sometimes they do not return home for two or three years at a time. But this unpleasant set-up is usually expected and known to the new arrivals, and most are there -just like the skilled expatriates -to make more money than they could at home. hundred political prisoners have been put on trial with several dozen being jailed, most of whom have been calling for an elected parliament. 31 In Qatar there have also been a small number of arrests and imprisonments for those who have criticised the ruler or the region's autocratic system. 32 In line with the arguments put forward earlier in this paper, almost all of those involved in the 'Gulf Spring' thus far have been citizens. 33 Only a tiny fraction of the several hundred political arrests that have taken place in the monarchies over the past two years have been expatriates, and none of the protestors that have thus far died in Bahrain, 34 Saudi Arabia, 35 and Oman tensions increased further, as it was deemed unlikely that all of the increase was due to natural growth or the naturalisation of stateless persons. Analysts have claimed that the natural rate of growth for the national population would have only yielded an increase of 47,000 persons, thus more than 72,000 were probably granted citizenship during this period. 43 Indeed, in summer 2010 opposition groups in Bahrain estimated that between 65,000 and 100,000 Sunni nationals had been added to the country's voter rolls over the previous decade.
Most of the newcomers 44 Bahrain, while adverts for the 'Urgent Need of the Bahraini National Guard' had begun to appear in Pakistani newspapers soon after the first protests in Bahrain. 47 Later in 2011
reports began circulating that Bahrain was also trying to recruit from Indonesia and Malaysia, with a noted Saudi scholar claiming that the 'Bahraini monarchy was at the end of its rope'
and that 'they [the monarchy] do not trust even the loyalists in Bahrain so they need to seek mercenaries from elsewhere -and these mercenaries will one day be captured and tried in public.' 48 Since then, it appears that the strategy has continued unabated, with a common grievance among many Bahraini opposition activists being that the men confronting their demonstrations are often not even Bahraini, and sometimes not even Arab. the 'exodus' of hundreds of its 'highly trained' security sector professionals to the UAE. 50 While the South African contingent is understood to be focused on anti-pirate training, the Colombians are thought to be focused on the other, internal security issues. In Kuwait, the issue has become similarly contentious, with one of prominent opposition figure Mussallam Al-Barrak's most controversial statements being that he feared the authorities were planning on hiring or had already begun hiring
Jordanian nationals into the security services. 55 While there is no evidence this has taken place or has been discussed in Kuwait, it is likely that the increasing cooperation, including is thought that 400 to 600 expatriates are being deported each month, being described as 'infiltrators,' 62 while in the UAE about 12,000 were deported over the few months following the end of a visa amnesty in February 2013. 63 But in some of the Gulf monarchies this current phenomenon has gone much further than merely targeting illegal residents, with even large numbers of long-serving, legally employed expatriates having their contracts abruptly
terminated and with what have been described as 'trivial reasons' being given for the immediate deportation of many other expatriates. This has led to a palpable culture of fear developing in some expatriate communities, with many having witnessed their colleagues or relatives being rounded up or struggling to finalize their affairs and vacate.
The deportations in Kuwait have attracted considerable attention, due to the scale and speed with which they have taken place. Government spokespersons have stated that the number of foreigners in Kuwait will be reduced by 100,000 each year for the next decade on the grounds that 'it is the right of any state to take appropriate legal action to ensure stability and security of the country.' A large number of expatriates are already thought to have been deported, with reports that many small businesses run by South Asians have closed and entire residential districts feel empty. 64 Several Kuwaiti government departments and agencies appear to be involved in the deportations and other associated cutbacks, with a reported 12,000 expatriates having been deported over the past year for traffic violations alone, 65 and with the contracts of several hundred expatriate teachers being terminated as they reached the age of sixty -despite a law having earlier been introduced that raised the age of retirement in the public sector to sixty-five. 66 Other restrictions have been imposed on expatriates, seemingly in an effort to cut costs and make Kuwait a less hospitable environment for foreign workers. These include the limiting of access to government hospitals to only nationals in the mornings, and a considerable tightening of the requirements for expatriates to gain a driving licence. Overall, the situation has been described in the tabloid press as being like a 'scary movie' for expatriates, with some even being fearful to take lifts in other people's cars or even step outside their accommodation. 67 In June 2013 jails were reported to be overcrowded, as more than 25,000 arrested in various raids were awaiting decisions on possible deportation. 68 Bangladeshi embassies called on Kuwait to introduce an amnesty period to allow their nationals to leave before deportation and 'conveyed their concern that legal peoples should not be deported, and that those deported should be paid their salaries.' 70 The Indian embassy believed that around 3600 of their nationals had been deported over the first half of 2013, and of these more than two thirds held legal passports. 71 The Philippines embassy has also been active, telling their nationals 'these events will pass, use your common sense, adapt' and 'not to panic.' One leaflet, describing the embassy's 'roving teams' that were ready to help
Filipinos on the brink of deportation, even told its frightened nationals that 'in the words of Winston Churchill… this is our finest hour.' 72 But it is in Saudi Arabia that the most dramatic developments have taken place, with over a million deportations having taken place over the past year, often with accompanying riots and violence. Rooted in a pre-Arab Spring plan to gradually ease out expatriates in favour of nationals, the 'nitaqat' or 'ranges' system (which rewards sectors with higher ratios of nationals to expatriates) is beginning to come into effect. 73 A deadline was initially set for
July 2013, with all employers warned that if they had not met their designated ratios they would be penalized, while expatriates who remained in the country beyond their termination date and without valid residency papers would be jailed and deported. Although the deadline was then extended to 4 November 2013, already the Indian embassy had issued over 90,000 emergency exit visas to its nationals in the country, while dozens of thousands of other foreign nationals had already returned home due to the scheme. 74 Meanwhile Pakistan repatriated 50,000 of its nationals ahead of the revised deadline, with a consequent impact on the flow of remittances between the two countries. It was estimated that monthly remittances from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan dropped by $23 million in May 2013 and by over $50 million in June 2013. 75 The impact on Egypt and Yemen's economies is likely to have been even more significant, with reports that up to 300,000 Egyptians left the kingdom over the summer period, 76 while expulsions to Yemen thought to have taken place at a rate of about 2000 per day, 77 with a total of 210,000 expected to return. 78 In the days and weeks following the expiration of the 4 November deadline, violent clashes broke out in several Saudi cities, with large communities of expatriates -many of whom had reportedly lived and worked in the country for many years -violently resisting arrest. In some cases pitched street battles took place between 'illegal expatriates', security forces, and vigilante citizens. In January 2014 the Ministry for the Interior nonetheless confirmed that quarter of a million had been rounded up and deported in the space of just three months. 79 Predictably, perhaps, jobs that had been vacated by expatriates were not assumed by Saudi citizens, especially in manual labour. Major investments houses in the kingdom have claimed that nearly $27 billion in construction, transport, and retail projects have been cancelled or delayed. 80 As with Kuwait, despite these inevitable problems that Saudi Arabia's economy will face as a result of such a rapidly shrinking expatriate labour force, it seems unlikely that the trend will be reversed, with influential pro-government commentators now claiming that 'these foreigners are a huge elephant in the room despite the country's ampleness, the financial ability of its residents, and their vast experience' and arguing that the kingdom's crumbling cities will be 'relieved' if foreigners leave and the 'parasite economy' comes to an end. 
